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Abstract
We study how becoming a grandparent affects grandparents’ labor supply. In a simple model
of the allocation of time in which seniors care about their offspring’s welfare and also value
time spent with family children, the sign of the effect is ambiguous. Using data from the Panel
Study of Income Dynamics we find evidence that becoming a grandparent causes a reduction
of employed grandmother’s hours of work. We identify a lower bound of about 190. This
effect originates towards the bottom of the hours distribution (i.e., among women less attached
to the labor market). For employed grandfathers, the effect is also negative, originates towards
the top of the hours distribution (i.e., where overtime work is substantial), but is smaller and
more imprecisely estimated than for women. We also find that for working grandmothers the
effect is stronger the closer grandparents and grandchildren live and during the first years since
becoming a grandparent (i.e., when the grandchildren are younger). The “extensive margin” of
grandparenting (becoming a grandparent) turns out to be much more important in generating
these effects than the corresponding “intensive” margin (having additional grandchildren).
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1 Introduction
The American Community Survey from the U.S. Census Bureau estimates that there are about 70
million grandparents in the U.S., almost 1/3 of the adult American population. The vast majority
of these have grandchildren well before reaching the end of working age. Time use data, in turn,
show that these individuals make large time transfers in the form of grandparent-provided child
care. In the literature, much is known about the labor supply consequences of becoming a parent,
something is known about the effect of grandparent-provided child care on parents’ labor supply,
but very little is known about the effect of grandparent-provided child care on grandparents’ own
labor supply. This paper addresses this issue and asks: How does becoming a grandparent affect
the labor supply of older workers?
We find evidence that becoming a grandparent reduces women’s labor supply along the inten-
sive margin; our baseline estimates indicate a lower bound of about 190 hours per year. The point
estimate for men is lower, a reduction of about 70 hours per year, although with a large standard
error and a possible upward bias. This asymmetric effect is consistent with the different respon-
siveness of men and women to changes in the opportunity cost of time, as has been documented
repeatedly in the literature on labor supply elasticities. Going beyond this baseline estimate, we
find that these labor supply adjustments by women take place at the lower quantiles of the hours
distribution; for men, on the contrary, they (if any) take place at the upper quantiles. Moreover, as
one would expect, distance between grandparents and the grandchild also matters. For women, the
reduction in hours of work increases with proximity to grandchildren, roughly (in lower bound)
an additional 100 hours if living in the same county and 130 if living in the same census tract.
However, it appears that for men the entire effect is driven by those living far away from the grand-
children, but again with large standard errors. We also find evidence that the effect is stronger the
more recently one became a grandparent (i.e., when one’s grandchildren are younger) and the older
one is. Finally, we find that becoming a grandparent (i.e., the “extensive margin” of grandparent-
ing) is much more important in generating these effects than having additional grandchildren (i.e.,
the “intensive” margin of grandparenting).
These non-negligible labor supply effects of becoming a grandparent are not surprising given
the picture emerging from the data on informal child care arrangements and time use. According to
the U.S. Census Bureau (Survey of Income and Program Participation) in 2011 as many as 23.4%
of all children under 5 years old living with their mother benefited from grandparent-provided
child care (between 5 and 14 years it is 13.4%), up from less than 15% in 1987. For 93% of these,
grandparents were the primary child care arrangement. These statistics do not include children
living with their grandparents, which according to the U.S. Census Bureau amounted to about 7%
of all children below 18 years old in 2010, up from 3.2% in 1970.
Correspondingly, time use data show that beginning around age 50, as parents become grand-
parents and, presumably, own children no longer need adult care, primary child care time does not
drop to zero, and actually increases for those who report a strictly positive amount of time spent
taking care of children. Figure 1 documents this fact by showing the average daily minutes spent in
primary child care, both unconditionally (i.e., including those who report zero minutes) and con-
ditional on reporting a strictly positive amount of minutes in the pooled 2008-2012 cross-section
of the American Time Use Survey (ATUS).1
1 Before age 50, 44% of women and 26% of men in this ATUS sample report spending a strictly positive amount
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These data are consistent with information from the Health and Retirement Study (HRS). In
the HRS, individuals are asked how much time they spent taking care of their grandchildren during
the past 12 months. Individuals in the HRS subsample were between 51 and 61 years old at
the time of the first interview in 1992. In that year, grandmothers who did at least one hour of
grandchild care reported spending, on average, about 820 hours taking care of their grandchildren.
The corresponding figure for grandfathers was about 440 hours. These statistics from the HRS
are in accordance with those from the ATUS, and are equivalent to about 21 and 11 workweeks,
respectively. Such large time transfers beg the question of how much grandparenting comes at the
expense of other forms of “leisure” and how much comes at the expense of market labor supply?
This is the central question of the paper.
Figure 1: Primary child care time by age, 2008-2012
Notes: Average daily minutes of primary child care (caring for and helping, and activities related to children’s ed-
ucation and health), and associated travel, by gender of the caregiver, in the pooled 2008-2012 cross sections of the
American Time Use Survey, by age of the respondent. Both children living in the household and those living in another
household are considered. The interpolating line is the best fourth order fractional polynomial. Individual sampling
weights are applied.
There is surprisingly little evidence on this point. A substantial body of quasi-experimental ev-
idence has accumulated over the past 20 years about the causal effect of child bearing on parental
labor supply.2 Virtually all studies find a negative effect using a variety of instruments to address
the endogeneity of fertility, such as twin births (Bronars and Grogger (1994) for unmarried mothers
in the US, and Jacobsen, Pearce, and Rosenbloom (1999) for married mothers)3, sibling-sex com-
position (Angrist and Evans (1998) for men and women in the US, and Cruces and Galiani (2007)
of minutes taking care of children. After age 50 these drop to 13% and 10%, respectively. The activities included are
caring for and helping, activities related to children’s education and health, and travel related to all of these.
2 Studies providing indirect evidence of this connection via the evaluation of public child care programs on
women’s labor supply have a long tradition in modern labor economics, starting with Heckman (1974).
3 The idea of using twin births as an exogenous shock to fertility traces back to Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1980).
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for women in Argentina and Mexico), gender of first-born child (Chun and Oh (2002) for women
in South Korea) early access to the pill (Bailey (2006) for women in the US), abortion legislation
(Bloom, Canning, Fink, and Finlay (2009) in a large cross-country panel data set).4 More recently,
researchers have begun investigating the effect of grandparents-provided child care on parental la-
bor supply. By providing free and flexible child care, grandparents may reduce the impact of child
bearing on parents’ labor supply. In an early paper, Cardia and Ng (2003) calibrate an OLG model
and show that grandparent-provided childcare has a positive effect on the labor supply of parents.
In an empirical counterpart of this calibration study, Dimova and Wolff (2011) use cross-country
data from the Survey of Health, Aging, and Retirement in Europe (SHARE) show that this is the
case for young European mothers. Posadas and Vidal-Fernandez (2012) instrument the availability
of grandparents-provided child care with death of the maternal grandmother in the National Lon-
gitudinal Survey of Youth 1979 (NLSY79), and find that the availability of grandparents increases
the labor force participation of mothers in the U.S. Compton and Pollak (2014) employ data from
the U.S. Census and from the National Survey of Families and Households (NSFH), and show
that spatial proximity to grandmothers increases the labor supply of women with young children,
presumably because of the availability of grandparent-provided child care.5
However, very little is known about the effect of grandparent-provided child care on grand-
parents’ own labor supply. Existing studies of the link between grandparenting and grandparents’
labor supply are descriptive in nature (i.e., do not address causality), and report mixed correlations.
Lei (2008) uses HRS data from 1996 to 2002, and finds a small positive correlation between the
number of grandchildren and grandmother’s labor supply along both the intensive and the exten-
sive margin. However, when including fixed effects the correlation becomes negative and insignif-
icant. Ho (2014) also uses HRS data and finds a positive correlation between the birth of a new
grandchild and married grandparents’ employment. She also finds a positive correlation between
married grandmothers’ hours of market work and the presence of a grandchild in the household.
Zamarro (2011) estimates on SHARE data the effect of being an employed grandmother on the
probability of providing child care. Instrumenting employment status with eligibility for social
security benefits, and finds a negative effect.
We take a systematic approach to this question using data from the Panel Study of Income
Dynamics (PSID) to estimate the effect of becoming a grandparent on grandparents’ (men and
women) labor supply (participation and hours), addressing the endogeneity of the grandparent
status. The PSID, as of 2013, spans 44 years and is especially well-suited for this research question.
Its genealogical design offers us the opportunity to link grandparents, parents, and grandchildren
for an extended period of time and for different cohorts, while observing the characteristics of all
three generations. Moreover, the longitudinal span of this survey allows us to observe the same
individuals both when they become parents and, many years later, when they become grandparents.
Although becoming a grandparent, unlike becoming a parent, results from the fertility choices
of someone else, there are at least two sources of endogeneity. First, preferences for fertility may be
transmitted from parents to children. Second, the cost of having a child decreases with the expected
4 However, when using self-reported measures of infertility as instruments, both Aguero and Marks (2008) in a
sample of Latin American countries, and Rondinelli and Zizza (2010) in sample of older Italian women find no effect
of child bearing on female labor force participation.
5 Additional, possible effects of grandparenting not directly related to labor supply have also been explored.
Reinkowski (2013) finds some positive correlation in SHARE data between taking care of the grandchildren and
grandparents’ physical and psychological health.
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time transfer a grandparent provides. In the reduced form approach we take in this paper, the first
problem can be mitigated by including individual fixed effects, but this is not enough to take care
of possible reverse causation in the second problem: one needs an instrument for the probability of
becoming a grandparent. Our strategy in this respect is based on the straightforward observation
that every valid instrument for one’s fertility, conditional on having at least one child, is also a valid
instrument for the probability of being a grandparent at any point in life, because such probability
increases with the number of own children. There are two such instruments that have been used
in the literature that we can also exploit. First, the sibling sex mix. Second, the gender of one’s
first child. In the context of grandparenting these instruments operate via the additional channel of
timing, because girls have children earlier than boys. We show that such a timing channel is more
important than the fertility one.6 These instruments are not without limitations, which we discuss
later in the paper. However, we show that such limitations do not threaten our central results.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 illustrates the underlying theo-
retical mechanisms and connects it to the econometrics. Section 3 contains the baseline empirical
analysis, Section 4 contains extensions of the baseline results, and Section 5 concludes.
2 Model
The model is intentionally simple. Its only purpose is to illustrate in a transparent way the mecha-
nisms relating grandchild care and grandparents’ labor supply, as well as the sources of endogene-
ity of the grandparent status in any empirical analysis of such mechanisms. Because we want to
study labor supply late in the working life, we employ a static model of the allocation of time a` la
Becker (1965).
We consider a population of older individuals (Seniors, henceforth) each with one adult child
(Junior, henceforth) whom in turn may or may not produce a grandchild (Baby, henceforth). That
is, from the viewpoint of Senior, becoming a grandparent is an uncertain–although possibly not
exogenous–event represented by a random variable g. If Junior produces Baby, then g= 1, other-
wise, g = 0. Families are defined along vertical lines: composed of Senior, Junior, and, possibly,
Baby. Although the distinction between married and unmarried grandparents is potentially impor-
tant and a collective model of family labor supply an appropriate framework, here we adopt the
basic unitary model. Seniors are altruistic in that they care about Junior’s welfare. There are three
goods: a composite consumption good, c, leisure, l, and time spent with family children (i.e., with
Baby), x. Consumption and leisure are normal goods.
In what follows we adopt the following three notational conventions: (i) a prime, “ ′ ”, denotes
objects that pertain to Junior; (ii) for derivatives, we adopt the subscript notation, so that fy denotes
the partial derivative of function f with respect to variable y; (iii) a 0 or 1 subscript denotes the
value a variable or function takes at the optimum when g = 0 and g = 1, respectively, so that, for
instance, y0 is y∗(g= 0) and f1 is f ∗(g= 1).
The utility functions of Senior and Junior (Baby has no choices to make in this model) are
denoted U and U ′, and represent well-behaved preferences, given by, respectively,
U = u(c)+ v(l)+υ(x)+ρ[u(c′)+ v(l′)+υ(x′)], (1)
U ′ = u(c′)+ v(l′)+υ(x′)+ ε(g), (2)
6 Another possible instrument is twin births, but there are too few cases in the PSID.
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where ρ is the intergenerational altruism parameter and ε(g) represents Junior’s unobserved (to
Senior) preference for producing Baby. Notice two things. First, the non-idiosyncratic components
of preferences are perfectly transmitted from Senior to Junior. Second, it is necessarily the case
that x0 = x′0 = 0; that is, if Junior does not produce Baby, no one in the family can enjoy time spent
with family children.
Senior and Junior are endowed with 1 unit of time, which they can supply to the labor market
(these supplies are denoted h and h′, respectively) at a given wage rate (w and w′, respectively),
enjoy as leisure, or spend with Baby—if present in the family. That is, the time constraints of
Senior and Junior are given by h+ l+ x= 1 and h′+ l′+ x′ = 1, respectively.
Child rearing requires a single input: a fixed amount of time, h¯. Child care is also available
on the market at price p per unit of time. The market supply is exogenous and perfectly elastic.
Therefore, time spent with children is both an input to child rearing and home production of a
valuable good (time spent with family children) for which there is no market. We assume that child
care time cannot be sold outside the family and that h¯ is sufficiently large so that, in equilibrium, x+
x′ ≤ h¯. The crucial difference between the two generations is that Junior can produce Baby, while
Senior can not. Therefore, the only way Senior can enjoy time with children is by supplying time to
the child rearing process when Junior produces Baby, i.e., grandparenting. Because child rearing
time can be purchased by junior on the market, grandparenting (x) is an intergenerational time
transfer. The other form of intergenerational transfer seniors can make is a monetary (consumption)
transfer, denoted t. We assume there are no commitment problems when Senior chooses x and t.
The budget constraints of Senior and Junior are given by, respectively,
c+ t = wh, (3)
c′+(h¯− x′− x)pg = w′h′+ t. (4)
We first analyze Junior’s decision to produce Baby, from the viewpoint of Senior. The solution
is a probability function:
Pr(g= 1) = Pr(U ′1 ≥U ′0)
= F [u(w′h′1− (h¯− x′− x)p)−u(w′h′0)+ v(l′1)− v(l′0)+υ(x′)−υ(0)]. (5)
The probability Senior becomes a grandparent depends on her or his time transfer x, both directly
via Junior’s budget constraint and indirectly via the equilibrium levels of h′1, l
′
1, and x
′. It is easy to
see that if h¯ is sufficiently large then such probability increases monotonically with x. Intuitively,
the time transfer from Senior reduces Junior’s cost of child bearing.7 The key point here is that g
and x are simultaneously determined. Such simultaneity highlights the fundamental endogeneity
problem one faces in empirical analyses of the effect of becoming a grandparent on labor supply.
Another source of endogeneity Eq. 5 makes clear is the intergenerational correlation of preferences:
the probability that Senior becomes a grandparent depends on the shape of her or his preferences
that are common to Junior (i.e., u,v, and υ).
7At an interior optimum, if h¯ is sufficiently large so that one does not desire to spend additional time with children
while such additional time is not needed to rear them, then both h′1 and l
′
1 increase, and x
′ declines (less than x
increases), with the time transfer x from Senior to Junior, because the latter relaxes Junior’s time constraint. The
same is true, via a relaxation of the budget constraint, for the asset transfer t. Therefore, the latter, too, increases the
probability of becoming a grandparent.
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Next, we analyze the intergenerational transfer and labor supply choices of Senior. We focus
on an interior solution for labor supply, leisure, and monetary transfers, for both a Senior with
a grandchild and one without. That is, (h1, l1, t1) > (0,0,0) and (h0, l0, t0) > (0,0,0). Denoting
by λ the multiplier on Senior’s budget constraint, and given that, at the optimum, uc = λ , the
optimum for a Senior with a grandchild (g= 1) is characterized, in addition to the time and budget
constraints, by the following conditions:
t1 : uc(wh1− t1) = ρuc(w′h′1− (h¯− x′− x)p+ t1), (6)
x : vl(1−h1− x)≥ υx(x)+ρuc(w′h′1− (h¯− x′− x)p+ t1)p, (7)
h1 : vl(1−h1− x) = wuc(c1). (8)
The corresponding conditions for a Senior without a grandchild (g= 0) are,
t0 : uc(wh0− t0) = ρuc(w′h′0+ t0), (9)
x : vl(1−h0)≤ υx(0)+ρuc(w′h′1− (h¯− x′)p+ t1)p, (10)
h0 : vl(1−h0) = wuc(c0). (11)
If condition (7) holds as a strict inequality at x = 0, then a grandparent transfers no time:
the value to Senior of the marginal unit of time in terms of either additional leisure or additional
consumption (via additional work) exceeds the value of spending that unit of time with Baby, net
of the benefit for Junior in terms of a relaxation of Junior’s budget constraint. In this case Senior
sets x = 0. This corresponds to the case in which (10) holds as an equality. In other words, a
Senior who does not sufficiently care for Baby and Junior behaves, in terms of intergenerational
time transfers, exactly like a Senior without a grandchild.
However, when (10) holds as a strict inequality, then a Senior without Baby in the family is
constrained into a suboptimal allocation of time. This Senior would like to spend time with the
grandchild but cannot because Junior has not produced a Baby. When Baby appears, a realloca-
tion of Senior’s time takes place according to conditions (7) and (Eq. 8). If we keep the transfer t
constant, then (because h0 and l0 are at an interior) such reallocation necessarily takes the form of
reduced leisure and reduced labor supply for a Senior who becomes a grandparent. However, the
monetary transfer, too, is adjusted when Baby appears, according to condition (6). If υx is suffi-
ciently large and ρ is sufficiently small then both l and h decrease. However, if υx is sufficiently
small and ρ is sufficiently large then l decreases and h increases. In other words, if Senior cares
sufficiently about Junior’s welfare but not as much about spending time with Baby, then he or she
may transfer more in terms of consumption (a higher t) and transfer little time or no time at all. In
this case leisure would still decrease, but labor supply would increase. Therefore, the labor supply
response of becoming a grandparent is ambiguous from a theoretical viewpoint. The remainder of
the paper aims at resolving this question empirically.
To connect the model with the empirical analysis, notice that the treatment effect of interest for
a Senior who is always at an interior (intensive margin effect, conditional on h1 > 0 and h0 > 0) is
h1−h0 = v−1l (wuc(c0))− v−1l (wuc(c1))− x, (12)
where v−1l is the inverse of vl . The effect for a Senior who may be or end up at a corner (extensive
margin effect) can be expressed as a probability function, assuming the econometrician does not
observe preferences (uc, or vl , or neither of the two):
Pr(h1 > 0)−Pr(h0 > 0) = Pr(vl(1− x)≤ wuc(c1))−Pr(vl(1)≤ wuc(c0)), (13)
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and the overall labor supply effect is the product of the two.
3 Empirical analysis
3.1 Data
We use data on household heads and their spouses from all of the available waves, to date, of the
PSID (1968-2011).8 This longitudinal data set is especially suited for the research question we
address in this paper. Its key feature in this respect, besides a unique time span for survey data, is
an endogenous intergenerational structure: when a child born to (or adopted by) a sample member
after the initial interview leaves a sample household to form her or his own household, the latter is
added to the sample. In the PSID, these endogenous additions are referred to as “split-offs”. This
mechanism implies that all descendants of the original, core sample families are observed for many
years if they were not yet born or if they were still living with their parents at the time of the first
interview. Therefore, grandparents and parents of sufficiently young cohorts can be linked to their
grandchildren and children, regardless of whether they live in the same household or not. Such
linkage is possible thanks to the Family Identification Mapping System (FIMS), a supplementary
data set specifically created for intergenerational analyses.9 Because we observe the entire life
cycle (or long portions of it) for several thousand individuals, we can observe the same individuals
both when they become parents and when, many years later, they become grandparents.
We restrict the sample to PSID core sample individuals born no earlier than 1927. That is,
individuals who were at most 40 years old at the time of the first interview in 1967 or later years.
This criterion ensures that at least some of the children (Junior) of these individuals (Senior) are
still present in the household at the time of the first interview and eventually become part of the
survey as split-offs, so that grandchildren (Baby), if any, are observed when they appear. After
applying this selection criterion we are left with an unbalanced panel of about 28,000 individuals
(56% of whom have a non-zero sampling weight), each observed on average for 11.4 waves (min
1 year, max 37 waves).10
Table 1 reports summary statistics for the four decades spanned by the data, computed applying
individual sampling weights. The differences across decades reflect both general demographic and
social changes (this is the case for age, ethnicity, marital status, education, fertility etc.) and
the endogenous demographic structure of the sample.11 For instance, we see in this table that
the fraction of individuals who are grandparents (“Grandparent”) increases over time, while the
fraction of those who become grandparents at some point during the life cycle (“Ever grandparent”)
decreases over time. This is due to the fact that the oldest cohort in the sample was 40 years old
in 1967. As this and younger cohorts become older we see the fraction of grandparents increasing.
8 The 2011 wave was released during the Summer of 2013.
9 Notice that attrition does not distort such mapping: it’s enough that the household of one’s descendant is observed
for just one year.
10When interpreting this average one must keep in mind that the PSID was at an annual frequency until the 1997
wave, and biennial thereafter.
11 The reason why the importance of the White non-Hispanic and Black non-Hispanic populations is at odds with
the national shares even after applying sampling weights is that the evolution of the PSID core sample is a pure
demographic evolution of the 1967 American population that does not take into account immigration. See Fiorito and
Zanella (2012) for an illustration of this point.
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On the other hand, because new, young cohorts enter the sample and are not observed as old
individuals, the fraction of sample individuals who are ever observed as grandparents declines over
time. The fact that these two series converge is a natural consequence of another fact; namely that
by restricting to the more recent decades one observes mostly young cohorts with short histories
in the panel. This same line of reasoning applies to the fraction of individuals who are parents
(“Parent”) and the fraction of those who become parents at some point during the life cycle (“Ever
parent”), which exhibit the same pattern.
Table 1: Summary statistics, full sample, by cohort
1967-1979 1980-1989 1990-1999 2000-2010
Age 32.1 37.1 41.6 46.6
Birth year 1941.7 1947.7 1952.2 1958.7
Male 0.455 0.456 0.461 0.466
White non-Hispanic 0.845 0.830 0.816 0.813
Black non-Hispanic 0.102 0.116 0.123 0.131
Married 0.808 0.724 0.688 0.641
Widowed 0.013 0.022 0.034 0.051
Divorced 0.067 0.105 0.116 0.130
Separated 0.031 0.031 0.028 0.025
Less than High School 0.250 0.170 0.135 0.097
High School 0.421 0.407 0.388 0.360
College 0.177 0.225 0.250 0.288
Parent 0.706 0.768 0.780 0.780
Ever parent 0.832 0.871 0.848 0.794
Children in household 1.59 1.02 0.83 0.65
Total fertility 2.36 2.33 2.18 1.94
Grandparent 0.068 0.180 0.248 0.308
Ever grandparent 0.617 0.517 0.433 0.346
Employed 0.788 0.832 0.773 0.734
Self-employed 0.080 0.102 0.107 0.108
Disability 0.085 0.133 0.158 0.176
Earnings 32.2 34.8 38.9 37.5
Family income 70.7 76.9 77.7 79.1
Individuals 7,584 8,219 9,665 9,184
Observations 62,078 64,428 56,381 42,929
Notes: Sample means for household heads and their spouses, PSID core sample 1967-2010, born in 1927 or later.
Earnings and total family income are expressed in thousands of constant 2010 dollars. Individual sampling weights
are applied, and the weighted sample is an unbalanced panel of about 15,000 distinct individuals.
In our analysis we use only individuals in this sample who satisfy the following three criteria:
(1) are biological or adoptive parents; (2) their oldest child is at least 14 years old; (3) are at most
70 years old. The first two criteria ensure that individuals in the final sample are comparable: only
those who satisfy them may be or become grandparents. The third criterion, coupled with the sec-
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ond, restricts the sample to working age grandparents and potential grandparents. Criteria (1)–(3)
reduce the sample to about 11,000 individuals (2/3 of whom have a non-zero sampling weight).
Table 2 reports the previous and additional summary statistics in the two groups which are the pri-
mary focus of this paper: those who satisfy criteria (1)–(3) and become grandparents at some point
between 1967 and 2010, and those who satisfy criteria (1)–(3) but do not become grandparents as
of 2010. This table is constructed pooling all observations across years and applying individual
sampling weights. Table 3 reports the corresponding gender breakdown.
In order to ensure the comparability of the two groups in the light of the differences emerging
from Table 1, we restrict in Table 2 and Table 3 to individuals born between 1927 and 1940 and
who are between 40 and 70 years old at any point between 1967 and 2010. Table 2 shows that
parents who eventually become grandparents are different from those who don’t along most of
the dimensions considered. The exceptions are exogenous characteristics such as gender, being
widowed, and having a condition that limits the amount or type of work one can do (“Disability”).
In particular, those who become grandparents are younger (because they became parents almost
3 years earlier, on average), are more likely to be married whites, have higher fertility, are more
likely to be employed, and have higher income.
Education seems balanced in Table 2, but Table 3 reveals an asymmetry between men and
women. Among men, it is the more educated who become grandparents. Among women, the
opposite holds. These and other differences emerging from Table 3 should be interpreted keeping
in mind the different incidence of singe mothers vs. single fathers, as well as the different mortality
rates of men and women late in the life cycle. We also see in these tables that the average number
of grandchildren is about 5.7. The median (not reported in the table) is 5. According to our data,
the average age Americans born between 1927 and 1940 became grandparents in the 1967-2010
period was 48.9, with a gender difference of 3 years: 50.5 for men and 47.6 for women, in line
with estimates from other sources as well as national trends in women’s age at first birth.12 The
median was 50 for men and 47 for women. Most of these differences between parents who become
grandparents and those who don’t persist in a regression of the “Ever grandparent” dummy on the
demographic and socioeconomic characteristics reported in these tables, age dummies and year
dummies.13. We will discuss the consequence of such obvious non-randomness of the grandparent
status after presenting OLS estimates.
3.2 OLS and fixed-effects analysis
We organize our empirical analysis around the following baseline linear model, in line with the
theory (i.e., Eq. 12 and Eq. 13):
Lit = α+βgit+λa+ητ+ εit , (14)
where Lit is a labor supply measure for individual i in year t, α is a constant, git is a dummy variable
equal to 1 if individual i is a grandparent at time t, and 0 otherwise (i.e., this variable is equal to 0 at
the baseline and switches permanently to 1 when the individual becomes a grandparent), a and τ are
12 According to the OECD Family Database, the average age of American women at the birth of their first child was
about 25 in 2006, up from about 22.5 in 1970.
13 The regression output is available from the authors upon request
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Table 2: Summary statistics, Seniors by grandparenting status
Become Do not become Difference p-value
grandparents grandparents
Age 54.0 54.9 –0.9 0.00
Birth year 1932.7 1932.5 0.2 0.00
Male 0.434 0.429 0.005 0.64
White non-Hispanic 0.850 0.770 0.080 0.00
Black non-Hispanic 0.092 0.165 –0.073 0.00
Married 0.812 0.757 0.055 0.00
Widowed 0.082 0.082 0.030 0.95
Divorced 0.083 0.144 –0.061 0.00
Separated 0.018 0.010 0.008 0.00
Less than High School 0.265 0.240 0.025 0.00
High School 0.416 0.422 –0.005 0.59
College 0.173 0.174 –0.001 0.90
Age became parent 23.5 26.2 –2.7 0.00
Years since parent 30.5 28.7 1.8 0.00
Children in household 0.51 0.31 0.20 0.00
Total fertility 3.54 2.00 1.54 0.00
Grandparent 0.689 0 – –
Ever grandparent 1 0 – –
Age became grandparent 48.9 – – –
Years since grandparent 10.0 – – –
Number of grandchildren 2.93 – – –
Total number of grandchildren 5.66 – – –
Employed 0.651 0.615 0.036 0.00
Self-employed 0.120 0.091 0.029 0.00
Disability 0.227 0.230 –0.003 0.73
Earnings 31.4 28.0 3.39 0.00
Family income 89.1 80.2 8.9 0.00
Individuals 1,682 200 –
Observations 35,540 3,291 –
Notes: Sample means for household heads and their spouses, PSID core sample 1967-2010, born between 1927 and
1940, who are no younger than 40 and no older than 70, and who have at least one biological or adoptive child who is
14 or older. Individuals in the first column become grandparents at some point between 1967 and 2010; individuals in
the second column do not become grandparents as of 2010. The p-value refers to a t-test of the null hypothesis that the
difference is zero. Earnings and total family income are expressed in thousands of constant 2010 dollars. Individual
sampling weights are applied.
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Table 3: Summary statistics, Seniors by grandparenting status and gender
Men Women
Become Do not become Become Do not become
grandparents grandparents grandparents grandparents
Age 54.2 55.2 53.9 54.7
Birth year 1932.6 1932.2 1932.8 1932.7
White 0.885 0.768 0.823 0.773
Black 0.069 0.173 0.109 0.159
Married 0.891 0.861 0.752 0.679
Widowed 0.035 0.044 0.119 0.111
Divorced 0.062 0.063 0.100 0.205
Separated 0.010 0.012 0.023 0.009
Less than High School 0.261 0.304 0.268 0.193
High School 0.344 0.282 0.471 0.527
College 0.238 0.221 0.123 0.139
Age became parent 25.0 28.2 22.3 24.6
Years since parent 29.2 27.0 31.6 30.0
Children in household 0.57 0.42 0.47 0.23
Total fertility 3.42 2.09 3.63 1.94
Grandparent 0.638 0 0.729 –
Ever grandparent 1 0 1 –
Age became grandparent 50.5 – 47.6 –
Years since grandparent 9.2 – 10.6 –
Number of grandchildren 2.57 – 3.20 –
Total number of grandchildren 5.52 – 5.78 –
Employed 0.767 0.759 0.562 0.507
Self-employed 0.190 0.125 0.060 0.064
Disability 0.216 0.249 0.236 0.215
Earnings 53.1 45.4 14.8 15.0
Family income 99.1 91.2 81.3 71.9
Individuals 669 92 1,013 108
Observations 13,886 1,385 21,654 1,906
Notes: Sample means for household heads and their spouses, by gender, PSID core sample 1967-2010, born between
1927 and 1940, who are no younger than 40 and no older than 70, and who have at least one biological or adoptive
child who is 14 or older. Individuals in the first column become grandparents at some point between 1967 and 2010;
individuals in the second column do not become grandparents as of 2010. The p-value refers to a t-test of the null
hypothesis that the difference is zero. Earnings and total family income are expressed in thousands of constant 2010
dollars. Individual sampling weights are applied.
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vectors of age and year dummies, and λ and η are the associated vectors of coefficients.14 Notice
that because of the way git is defined (and because of the longitudinal nature of the data), this
empirical model exploits two different margins of variation: the event of becoming a grandparent
earlier than other individuals (cross-sectional margin), and the timing of such an event over the life
cycle (longitudinal margin).
We use three different measures of labor supply, Lit . First, hours conditional on being employed
(i.e., excluding individuals reporting zero hours), denoted hit . In this case β is the intensive margin
effect conditional on being at an interior:
β = E(hit |git = 1,hit > 0)−E(hit |git = 0,hit > 0), (15)
which corresponds to h1− h0 in the model, Eq. 12. Second the employment indicator (i.e., a
dummy taking value 1 if an individual reports a strictly positive number of hours in a given year,
and 0 otherwise), denoted eit . In this case β is the extensive margin effect:
β = E(I[hit > 0]|git = 1)−E(I[hit > 0]|git = 0), (16)
which corresponds to Pr(h1 > 0)−Pr(h0 > 0) in the model, Eq. 13. Finally, unconditional hours
(i.e., including individuals with zero hours), denoted Hit . In this case β is a conflation of intensive
and extensive margin effects:
β = E(hit |git = 1)−E(hit |git = 0)
= E(hit |git = 1,hit > 0)E(I[hit > 0]|git = 1)
−E(hit |git = 0,hit > 0)E(I[hit > 0]|git = 0), (17)
which corresponds to h1Pr(h1 > 0)−h0Pr(h0 > 0) after combining Eq. 12 and Eq. 13.
Henceforth, we restrict the analysis to parents born in 1927 or later, who are no older than
70 and whose older child is at least 14. That is, using the terminology introduced in Section 2,
we focus on Senior’s labor supply. In this group, 39% of all pooled observations correspond to
grandparents (68% if restricting to the group 50 or older, 24% if restricting to the group below
50). Among these, 95% have at least one grandchild who is 12 years old or younger. Furthermore,
here and in all of the following regressions, standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and are
clustered at the individual level. Contrary to what we did in Section 3.1 to obtain representative
means, we do not apply sampling weights to this and all following regressions. This choice follows
Solon, Haider, and Wooldridge (2013), who suggest that in a regression context it may be prefer-
able to just condition on variables, if available, that account for the unequal sampling probabilities
relative to the population of interest. Because the imbalance of the PSID core sample relative to the
American population is chiefly due to differences in income at the time the sample was constructed
in 1967,15 conditioning on family income in that year (denoted y67) is a parsimonious way of re-
taining a large sample size (weighting would cause the loss of about 1/3 of the sample because
14 We refrain from including in the regression additional controls (such as education, marital status, etc.) that would
only exacerbate the endogeneity problem discussed below. However, we will later report the results from an extended
specification with several additional regressors.
15 The “core sample” of the PSID was constructed by merging two subsamples: the SRC subsample, which was
extracted from the Census and was representative of the US population at the time, and the SEO subsample, which
was a sample of low-income households.
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these observations are assigned a zero weight) while taking into account the different sampling
probabilities.
OLS estimates of Eq. 14 are reported in Table 4. This table shows a modest (about 55 hours
per year) negative intensive margin effect for employed men, no intensive margin effect for em-
ployed women, and a significant extensive margin effect for both men and women of 3.7 and 5.4
percentage points, respectively. The overall labor supply effect is negative and significant: about
125 hours per year for men, and about 90 for women.
The obvious problem with these estimates is that becoming a grandparent, even conditional
on being a Senior whose youngest Junior is at least 14 years old and despite being determined by
someone else’s (one’s Junior) fertility choices, is not an exogenous event. Table 2 is a testament to
this fact. As the model in section 2 illustrates, there are at least two sources of endogeneity in an
equation like Eq. 14: unobserved heterogeneity and simultaneity. The first implies the possibility
that one’s unobserved taste for work correlates with the probability of becoming a grandparent.
For instance, preferences for fertility may be transmitted from Senior to Junior—like in the model.
In this case, because fertility and labor supply are jointly determined, after Junior reaches fertility
age Senior’s unobserved taste for work correlates with the grandparent status. Also, Seniors who
have a strong desire to become grandparents for reasons related to their preference for leisure (e.g.,
a comparative disadvantage in market production relative to home production) may exert pressure
on Junior to induce them to produce Baby.
Table 4: OLS estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
hit hit eit eit Hit Hit
men women men women men women
git –53.6 6.4 –0.037 –0.054 –124.3 –87.2
(17.2) (13.8) (0.009) (0.009) (24.4) (18.8)
y67i 1.6 –0.2 0.001 0.001 2.8 1.2
(0.2) (0.2) (0.000) (0.000) (0.4) (0.3)
Constant 2115.5 1743.5 0.872 0.726 1851.0 1263.5
(22.4) (19.6) (0.011) (0.012) (31.3) (24.0)
Observations 37,722 48,331 44,998 71,965 44,998 71,965
Fixed effects No No No No No No
Age dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: OLS estimates from Eq. 14, PSID core sample, waves 1968-2011, individuals (Seniors, in Section 2) no older
than 70 who have at least one child (Junior, in Section 2) who is 14 or older. The dependent variables are, alternately,
annual hours of work for pay conditional on being employed (i.e., excluding zero hours, hit ), an employment dummy
(eit ), and unconditional annual hours of work for pay (i.e., including zero hours, Hit ). Independent variable git is a
dummy assuming value 1 if individual i has at least one grandchild (Baby) at time t, and zero otherwise. Covariate
y67i is family income in 1967 and controls for unequal sampling probabilities in a regression framework (Solon et al.
(2013)). Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the individual level.
This form of endogeneity can be mitigated by individual fixed effects, which is feasible be-
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cause we have a panel. In this case, family income in 1967 is constant for an individual and so is
subsumed in the fixed effect. Results are reported in Table 5. This table confirms a modest negative
intensive margin effect on employed men of about 50 hours, and shows a positive effect of sim-
ilar magnitude on employed women’s hours. The extensive margin effects becomes smaller and
insignificant relative to the OLS estimates. Overall labor supply, according to these fixed-effects
estimates, declines by almost 80 hours per year for grandfathers and increases by almost 50 hours
per year for grandmothers.
Notice that all of the fixed-effects coefficients on git are above the OLS estimates. This sug-
gests the presence of unobserved components of preferences that positively affect labor supply,
negatively correlate with the grandparent status, and so bias the OLS estimates downward. The
omitted variable bias formula indicates that this happens, for instance, if Senior has an unobserved
taste for both reduced labor supply and higher fertility which is also transmitted to Junior. In this
case, those who are more likely to become grandparents are also those who are more likely to work
less. Fixed effects account for this correlation and produce larger coefficients.
Table 5: Fixed-effects estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
hit hit eit eit Hit Hit
men women men women men women
git –46.4 50.5 –0.013 0.011 –76.2 47.3
(14.8) (13.2) (0.008) (0.007) (20.1) (14.5)
Constant 2203.3 1697.2 0.889 0.678 1956.0 1127.3
(26.8) (23.1) (0.013) (0.012) (35.1) (22.9)
Individuals 4,144 5,808 4,318 6,418 4,318 6,418
Observations 37,722 48,331 44,998 71,965 44,998 71,997
Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Age dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Fixed Effects-OLS estimates from Eq. 14, PSID core sample, waves 1968-2011, individuals (Seniors, in
Section 2) no older than 70 who have at least one child (Junior, in Section 2) who is 14 or older. The dependent
variables are, alternately, annual hours of work for pay conditional on being employed (i.e., excluding zero hours,
hit ), an employment dummy (eit ), and unconditional annual hours of work for pay (i.e., including zero hours, Hit )..
Independent variable git is a dummy assuming value 1 if individual i has at least one grandchild (Baby) at time t, and
zero otherwise. Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the individual level.
3.3 Instrumental variable analysis
The second form of endogeneity stems from possible strategic interactions. Even our extremely
simple model makes clear that the probability of becoming a grandparent increases in the expected
time transfer from the old to the young, because the latter reduces the cost of child bearing—
Eq. 5 can be though of as a “stochastic incentive compatibility constraint”. In this case, causation
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runs the other way: it is (Junior’s expectations over) Senior’s labor supply that causes Senior to
become a grandparent. For instance, if one’s grown-up children anticipate that one is going to
retire next year and so will be available (and willing) to help with child care, this makes one more
likely to become a grandparent the year he or she reduces labor supply, or shortly after. The
ensuing simultaneity is a trickier form of endogeneity which cannot be mitigated by fixed effects.
A solution is an exclusion restriction in the form of an instrument for the probability of becoming
a grandparent, unrelated to life cycle labor supply.
3.3.1 Finding instruments
A way of constructing such an instrument is to draw from the literature on fertility and labor supply
we have briefly summarized in Section 1. In Angrist and Evans (1998) the natural experiment is
the variation in sibling sex composition across couples. They exploit the long-standing observation
that couples whose first two children are either two boys or two girls have a stronger tendency to
have at least one additional child, because of a taste for variety. Because the higher the number
of children one has the higher the probability that one will become a grandparent, this is also a
valid instrument for git in Eq. 14. We report in Figure 2 the fraction of individuals in the PSID
born between 1927 and 1940 who become grandparents as of 2010, as a function of their total,
lifetime fertility. Individuals with only one child have an unconditional probability of about 58%
of becoming grandparents at some point during their life.16 This probability increases to about
87% for those with two children, to more than 92% for those with three children, and so on, until
it becomes virtually 100% for those with more than 5 children.
Figure 2: Total own fertility and probability of becoming grandparent
Notes: The figure shows the fraction of individuals in our PSID sample who are born between 1927 and 1940 and
who become grandparents before 2010 as a function of their total, lifetime fertility. Individual sampling weights are
applied.
16 This probability is underestimated because the younger cohorts in this group are not observed through their old
years, which lie ahead of 2010
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Sibling sex composition, however, affects the probability of becoming a grandparent via an ad-
ditional channel, namely timing. Because girls mate and have children before boys, an individual
whose first two children are two girls and who eventually becomes a grandparent will have grand-
children, ceteris paribus, earlier than her or his counterpart whose first two children are of any
other gender mix. We show below that, in fact, the timing channel appears to be more important
than the fertility channel. Formally, this instrument is defined as follows:
twogirls=
{
1 if first two children are females,
0 if first two children are of another mix. (18)
One drawback of this instrument is that it is not defined for those Seniors who had just one
child, and so removes them from the sample. This means a reduced sample size. But there is
a second, more worrisome consequence. It has been observed (see, e.g., Lundberg (2005) and,
more recently, Ichino, Lindstrom, and Viviano (2013)) that although the gender of one’s first child
is overwhelmingly random in the U.S. and other places where selective abortion is not an issue,
precisely because of possible preferences for the gender mix of one’s offspring the gender and
number of subsequent children may well be endogenous. This, in turn, means two things. First,
restricting the sample to individuals with at least two children may lead one to focus on a group
that is systematically different from the rest. Second, possible violation of the instrument exclusion
restriction.
In order to overcome these limitations we also employ the gender of one’s first child as an
alternative instrument. The rationale is, again, twofold. First, Dahl and Moretti (2008) show
that American couples with a first-born girl tend to have more children, a “demand for sons” that
was previously thought to be still present in some less developed countries but absent from most
developed ones. Therefore, this variable, too, may affect the probability of becoming a grandparent
in the PSID. One additional advantage is that as far as the fertility channel is exploited, this is a
stronger instrument because, as Figure 2 illustrates, the effect of own fertility on the probability
of becoming a grandparent is much stronger when moving from one to two children than when
moving from two to three. Second, as before, girls begin reproducing earlier than boys. Formally,
this alternative instrument is defined as follows:
girl f irst =
{
1 if first child is female,
0 if first child is male (19)
While the gender of one’s first child is arguably as good as randomly assigned in the U.S.,
possible violation of the exclusion restriction is an issue because of well-established evidence that
a first-born girl affects parents’ behavior in ways that may be reflected in the allocation of time
at different points of the life cycle. Lundberg (2005) offers a comprehensive survey of such evi-
dence, and both Dahl and Moretti (2008) themselves and Ichino et al. (2013)) have more recently
produced additional data about the consequences of a first-born girl vs. a first-born boy.
We defer a discussion of the consequences of this threat to our identification strategy until
after the presentation of our baseline results. As it turns out, when the violation of the exclusion
restriction is produced by the main effects documented in the literature then we can establish the
sign of the bias. This, if any, is such that we can still interpret the estimates obtained with the
girl f irst instrument as lower bounds, in absolute value.
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Table 6 shows the effect of the sibling-sex mix and of the gender of one’s first child on own
fertility, grandparent status, and age one becomes a grandparent, by gender. The fraction of the
sample who had a certain sibling-sex mix at first two births and a certain gender at first birth are
virtually identical to those reported by Angrist and Evans (1998), Table 3, using Census data. Most
notably, Table 6 suggests that in our sample the timing channel is more important than the fertility
channel: while in this table we don’t see significant fertility differences across the two groups
defined by twogirls and girl f irst (although the differences are systematically positive) we do see
large differences in the timing of becoming a grandparent across the two groups defined by the
instruments. Women who had two girls as first two children become grandmothers more than 2
years earlier than those who had a different mix. And both men and women whose first child was a
girl become grandparents earlier than those who had a boy. The difference is about 1 and 2 years,
respectively. Table 7 reproduces these differences in a regression framework (except for the effect
of twogirls and girl f irst on the probability of ever becoming a grandparent, which is related to our
first stage and which we discuss separately), conditioning on age and year dummies. This table
confirms, by and large, the unconditional effects reported in Table 6. In sum, both instruments
chiefly operate through the timing channel, and there seem to be advantages in using both of them
as an alternative to each other. Eventually, girl f irst will be our preferred instrument because, as
one would expect, it performs much better than twogirls.
Notice that both when using the sibling sex mix and the gender of first child, the instrument is a
constant throughout the life cycle, and so we cannot, at the same time, employ the within estimator.
Therefore, our IV estimates are based on pooled two-stage least squares.
3.3.2 Baseline IV estimates
Table 8 reports first-stage estimates for each of the two instruments, by gender. This table shows
that having had two girls as the first two children increases the probability of being a grandparent
at any point in time, after controlling for age and time effects, by about 6 percentage points for men
and 8 percentage points for women. The effect of having had a girl as first child in the larger sample
of those with at least one child is essentially the same. The F-statistic on the excluded instrument
indicates that this second instrument is, as expected, stronger. In addition to a larger sample size,
this is because the shock to the probability of becoming a grandparent when moving from 1 to
2 children is stronger than the corresponding shock when moving from 2 to 3, as illustrated in
Figure 2. Table 8 also shows that both instruments are stronger for women than for men. Given
that we don’t see major gender differences in the relevant portion of Table 6, this is mostly due to
the larger female sample size.17 In turn, the larger female component of the sample is due both to
the different mortality rate of men and women late in the life cycle and to the unequal sampling
probabilities—when applying sampling weights, as Table 1 shows, the gender ratio is much more
balanced.
Second-stage results are reported in Table 9 and Table 10 for the twogirls and girl f irst in-
struments, respectively. Table 9 shows a consistently negative effect of becoming a grandparent
on Senior’s labor supply, except for men’s extensive margin. This effect, however, is never pre-
cisely estimated: instrument twogirls does not help detecting statistically significant effects. Ta-
17This is confirmed by the following experiment: we randomly dropped observations in the female sample so to
reduce its size to the male sample, and we estimated the first-stage equations on the resulting data. The F-stat on the
excluded instruments drops to little above the level obtained in the male sample.
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Table 6: Fertility and grandparent status by gender of first child and sibling sex mix, statistics
Fraction of Total Fraction had Became Age became
sample fertility another child grandparent grandparent
All Men Women Men Women Men Women Men Women
Sibling mix:
(1) Two girls 0.242 2.82 2.88 0.493 0.507 0.924 0.937 48.20 44.11
(0.05) (0.02) (0.023) (0.019) (0.024) (0.020) (0.57) (0.41)
(2) Other mix 0.758 2.76 2.80 0.458 0.463 0.924 0.919 49.19 46.29
(0.03) (0.04) (0.013) (0.011) (0.013) (0.012) (0.28) (0.24)
Two boys 0.269 2.77 2.83 0.489 0.489 0.917 0.917 49.90 47.28
Other, excl. (1) 0.490 2.80 2.82 0.458 0.469 0.862 0.869 48.61 45.19
diff (1) – (2) 0.051 0.080 0.035 0.043 0.000 0.019 –0.98 –2.17
(0.080) (0.050) (0.026) (0.022) (0.031) (0.024) (0.63) (0.47)
p-val 0.35 0.10 0.18 0.05 0.99 0.43 0.12 0.00
Individuals: 7,525 2,930 4,595 2,930 4,595 681 1,019 1,138 2,021
First child:
(3) Girl 0.478 2.39 2.51 0.773 0.804 0.897 0.897 48.37 44.59
(0.03) (0.03) (0.013) (0.010) (0.017) (0.017) (0.35) (0.28)
(4) Boy 0.522 2.34 2.45 0.760 0.807 0.875 0.882 49.30 46.60
(0.03) (0.03) (0.012) (0.010) (0.019) (0.016) (0.32) (0.27)
diff (3) – (4) 0.05 0.06 0.013 –0.003 0.022 0.016 –0.92 –2.01
(0.05) (0.04) (0.17) (0.015) (0.026) (0.024) (0.47) (0.39)
p-val 0.33 0.17 0.44 0.86 0.40 0.51 0.05 0.00
Individuals: 8,964 3,701 5,263 3,701 5,263 781 1,120 1,250 2,195
Notes: The table reports, by gender, means and standard errors of total, lifetime fertility, probability of having an
additional child, probability of becoming a grandparent (for those born no later than 1940), and age one becomes
a grandparent in the groups defined by, respectively, twogirls and girl f irst. PSID core sample, waves 1968-2011,
individuals (Seniors, in Section 2) no older than 70 who have at least one child (Junior, in Section 2) who is 14 or
older. Individual sampling weights are applied. The p-value refers to a t-test of the null hypothesis that the difference
between the means is zero.
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Table 7: Fertility and grandparent status by gender of first child and sibling sex mix, regression
Total fertility Had another child Age became grandparent
Men Women Men Women Men Women
twogirls 0.030 0.018 0.008 –0.002 –1.318 –1.802
(0.030) (0.030) (0.011) (0.009) (0.329) (0.247)
girl f irst 0.059 0.035 0.036 0.024 –1.077 –1.768
(0.038) (0.035) (0.017) (0.014) (0.393) (0.288)
Notes: The table reports, by gender, the coefficients from a regression of total, lifetime fertility, indicator for whether
one had an additional child, indicator for whether one becomes a grandparent, and age one becomes a grandparent,
over twogirls and girl f irst. PSID core sample, waves 1968-2011, individuals (Seniors, in Section 2) no older than 70
who have at least one child (Junior, in Section 2) who is 14 or older. Age and year dummies are included as additional
dependent variables. Family income in 1967 (y67i) is included as an additional independent variable to controls for
unequal sampling probabilities in a regression framework (Solon et al. (2013)). Robust standard errors in parentheses,
clustered at the individual level.
Table 8: First stage results
(1) (2) (3) (4)
git git git git
men women men women
twogirlsi 0.059 0.083
(0.015) (0.012)
girl f irsti 0.067 0.090
(0.012) (0.010)
y67i –0.002 –0.002 –0.002 –0.002
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Constant 0.143 0.046 0.088 0.014
(0.083) (0.023) (0.068) (0.022)
F-stat, excl. instrument 15.32 49.31 32.50 84.74
Fixed effects No No No No
Age dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 38,839 63,649 44,998 71,965
Notes: First-stage estimates, i.e., effect of twogirls and girl f irst on the probability of being a grandparent at some
point during the life cycle, conditional on being a parent. PSID core sample, waves 1968-2011, individuals (Seniors,
in Section 2) no older than 70 who have at least one child (Junior, in Section 2) who is 14 or older. Covariate y67i is
family income in 1967 and controls for unequal sampling probabilities in a regression framework (Solon et al. (2013)).
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the individual level.
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ble 10 shows that the second, stronger instrument, girl f irst, detects a negative effect of becoming
a grandmother on the labor supply of employed women. The magnitude of the effect is about 380
hours per year. The intensive margin effect on employed men is much smaller, about 140 hours,
but still imprecisely estimated. When using girl f irst, extensive margin estimates are positive and
large for men. The overall labor supply effect is positive for men (about 100 hours) and a negative
for women (230 hours). However, the associated standard errors are too large to draw reliable
conclusions on extensive margin and overall labor supply effects.
Table 9: IV estimates. Instrument: twogirls (IV1)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
hit hit eit eit Hit Hit
men women men women men women
git –629.8 –293.5 0.137 –0.078 –291.0 –317.2
(373.8) (230.9) (0.167) (0.151) (481.8) (315.7)
y67i 0.6 –0.9 0.001 0.001 2.5 0.6
(0.7) (0.5) (0.000) (0.000) (0.9) (0.8)
Constant 1968.9 887.9 0.118 -0.053 600.3 –298.5
(421.6) (287.9) (0.182) (0.173) (522.8) (356.9)
Observations 32,690 42,336 38,839 63,649 38,839 63,649
Fixed effects No No No No No No
Age dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Second-stage estimates from 2SLS estimates of Eq. 14, PSID core sample, waves 1968-2011, individuals
(Seniors, in Section 2) no older than 70 who have at least one child (Junior, in Section 2) who is 14 or older. The
dependent variables are, alternately, annual hours of work for pay conditional on being employed (i.e., excluding zero
hours, hit ), an employment dummy (eit ), and unconditional annual hours of work for pay (i.e., including zero hours,
Hit ). The instrument is twogirls, as defined in Eq. 18. First-stage estimates are reported in Table 8. Covariate y67i is
family income in 1967 and controls for unequal sampling probabilities in a regression framework (Solon et al. (2013)).
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the individual level.
In sum, our analysis identifies a significant negative effect of becoming a grandmother on
employed women’s labor supply: 380 hours per year. Such an effect is admittedly large, and stands
in sharp contrast with the OLS and FE estimates—an order of magnitude larger. Furthermore, for
women the IV estimate has the opposite sign than the OLS and FE ones. We offer two explanations.
First, the magnitude reflects the local nature of the IV estimate. That is, the local average
treatment effect we identify differs from the average treatment effect of interest. Specifically, it is
larger in absolute value. The reason is that under the maintained exclusion restriction assumptions,
the instruments allow us to identify the effect of becoming a grandparent on the labor supply of
parents whose first two children are girls and with a first-born girl, respectively. However, it is a
well-documented fact that maternal grandmothers have different access to the grandchildren. For
instance, Compton and Pollak (2014) show that maternal grandmothers do more grandparenting
than paternal ones. Because at each birth the probability of having a girl is 50%, we can divide our
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Table 10: IV estimates. Instrument: girl f irst (IV2)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
hit hit eit eit Hit Hit
men women men women men women
git –142.2 –383.7 0.106 0.011 107.2 –231.4
(228.7) (170.3) (0.119) (0.112) (342.4) (232.6)
y67i 1.4 –1.0 0.001 0.001 3.2 0.8
(0.4) (0.4) (0.000) (0.000) (0.7) (0.6)
Constant 1413.0 998.4 0.156 –0.152 189.7 –403.3
(270.0) (223.7) (0.130) (0.126) (367.5) (259.1)
Observations 37,722 48,331 44,998 71,965 44,998 71,965
Fixed effects No No No No No No
Age dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Second-stage estimates from 2SLS estimates of Eq. 14, PSID core sample, waves 1968-2011, individuals
(Seniors, in Section 2) no older than 70 who have at least one child (Junior, in Section 2) who is 14 or older. The
dependent variables are, alternately, annual hours of work for pay conditional on being employed (i.e., excluding zero
hours, hit ), an employment dummy (eit ), and unconditional annual hours of work for pay (i.e., including zero hours,
Hit ). The instrument is girl f irst, as defined in Eq. 19. First-stage estimates are reported in Table 8. Covariate y67i is
family income in 1967 and controls for unequal sampling probabilities in a regression framework (Solon et al. (2013)).
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the individual level.
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estimates by 2, and thus identify a lower bound for the average effect of interest.18 Therefore, the
girl f irst instrument identifies, in particular, a significant lower bound of about 190 hours on the
labor supply of an employed woman after she becomes a grandmother.
Second, as discussed above, the instrument is supposed to take care of possible bias arising
from reverse causality. In particular, the possibility that a future, anticipated reduction in Senior’s
labor supply reduces Junior’s expected cost of child bearing and so increases the probability that
Senior becomes a grandparent. If this is the case and if the instrument identifies the true effect
of becoming a grandparent, then the IV estimates may well invert the sign of the OLS and the
FE ones, which would both be affected by simultaneity bias. A simple example illustrates this
point. Let’s consider hours conditional on employment in a univariate two-equation model with
perfect forecast about Senior’s labor supply. The first equation determines hours as a function of
the grandparent status, and the second equation is a linear probability model for the likelihood of
becoming a grandparent as a function of the perfectly forecast variation in hours between period t
and period t+1, ∆hit ≡ hit+1−hit . For simplicity, we omit the constant:
hit = βgit+ εit (20)
git = b∆hit+ eit , (21)
where b< 0 (i.e., the higher the expected reduction in hours, the higher the probability of becoming
a grandparent). Solving the system, assuming for simplicity that εit , eit , and hit+1 are pairwise
uncorrelated, assuming that εit and eit are zero-mean, and normalizing the variance of εit to 1, then
if one runs a regression of hit over git , one obtains the linear projection coefficient:
E(hit+1git)
E(g2it)
=
βb2E(h2it+1)+β −b
b2E(h2it+1)+b2var(εit)+1
, (22)
which of course reduces to the true causal effect β if b= 0, i.e., if there is no simultaneity bias. It
is easy to check that for all b < 0 (but not for all b > 0), in fact, the linear projection coefficient
in Eq. 22 is above β (and the more so the higher the absolute value of b), like our OLS and FE
coefficients are above the IV ones.
The intution is the following. Grandparenthood is an absorbing state, i.e., git switches to and
remains at 1 when one becomes a grandparent. If one ignores Eq. 21 then, using the terminology
of Section 2, the more Senior’s prospective reduction in labor supply increase the likelihood that
Junior produces Baby, the more the OLS and the FE estimators incorrectly associate a higher value
of current labor supply when git switches to 1 to the switch itself rather than to the prospective
larger fall in labor supply which is one of the causes of the switch.19
18 This is obvious for the girl f irst instrument. For the twogirls instruments, suppose the effect for those with two
girls is 1. These are 25% of the total. Then the effect for those with one boy and one girl is, at worst, 0.5—these are
50% of the total—and the effect for those with two boys is, at worst, zero—these are 25% of the total. The weighted
average is, again, 1/2.
19 Another way to see this is to notice that, because b < 0, if grandparenting did not affect labor supply (i.e., if
β = 0) then the linear projection coefficient would be strictly positive—although probably quite small.
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3.3.3 Addressing IV pitfalls
As mentioned above, a major concern with our preferred instrument, girl f irst, is the possible
violation of the exclusion restriction, because a first-born girl may affect outcomes potentially
related to labor supply at different stages of the life cycle. One such effect is own fertility, which
is one of rationales of the instrument itself. If a first-born girl induces higher fertility and the latter
has a persistent effect on labor supply, then the instrument affects the outcome via a channel (own
fertility) other than the probability of becoming a grandparent. However, the evidence does not
support this scenario. Although young children do have a negative effect on the labor supply of
young mothers, Bronars and Grogger (1994), Jacobsen et al. (1999), and Rondinelli and Zizza
(2010) all find that this effect is non-persistent. That is, higher fertility seems to be unrelated to
women’s labor supply after age 40, when the grandparenting “treatment” may kick in.
Another well-documented effect of a first-born girl vs. first-born boy is reduced marital stabil-
ity, a fact first noted by Morgan, Lye, and Condran (1988).20 Therefore, the gender of one’s first
child may affect labor supply late in the working life via marital history. However, in this case we
can establish the sign of the ensuing bias. It turns out that such bias, if present, only makes our
lower bounds even more conservative. To illustrate, consider the univariate version of the empirical
model in Eq. 14, with marital stability as an omitted variable:
Lit = α+βgit+ εit ; (23)
εit = γ ·divorcedit+υit , (24)
where divorcedit is a dummy variable assuming value 1 if individual i is divorced or separated at
time t, and zero otherwise. Johnson and Skinner (1986) and Bedard and Deschenes (2005) show
that divorcedit is associated with higher female labor supply. We also see this fact in our own final
sample, where employed women who are divorced or separated work 249 hours (s.e. 10.9) more
than those who are not. The corresponding association with the employment rate is 13.5 percentage
points (s.e. 0.06). Therefore, for these women γ > 0 in Eq. 24. Now suppose we use girl f irsti as
an instrument for git in Eq. 23, and that cov(girl f irsti,υit) = 0. However, given the evidence on
the effect of a first-born girl on marital stability, cov(girl f irsti,divorceit) = ρ > 0. This implies
that cov(girl f irsti,εit) = γρ > 0, and the exclusion restriction is violated. The probability limit of
the IV estimator in this case is:
plim βˆIV = β +
γρ
cov(girl f irsti,git)
.
Given that γρ > 0, the bias term is positive because our first-stage implies cov(girl f irsti,git)>
0. Therefore, for women in our final sample βˆIV is a lower bound (in absolute value, given that
this estimate is negative) of the true effect of interest, β . This line of reasoning, of course, extends
to the multivariate model we employed, and to other possible channels that are similarly related
to labor supply and gender of one’s first child.21 For men, the sign of γ is actually negative in
20 Using data from the June 1980 CPS, they find that “For couples with one child, [...] the risk of disruption is 9%
higher for those with a daughter than for those with a son” (p. 115).
21 For instance, Ichino et al. (2013) report that a first-born girl increases the health of one’s offspring and the latter,
in turn, has a positive effect on mothers’ labor supply.
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our final sample, where employed men who are divorced or separated work 76 hours per year (s.e.
17) less than those who are not, and all divorced or separated men are 7.5 percentage points (s.e.
0.08) less likely to be employed than their counterparts in a different marital status. The same kind
of reasoning used for women implies that the effect of becoming a grandparent on men’s labor
supply is actually smaller, in absolute value, than the one reported above, and can potentially be of
opposite sign. This is a good reason for interpreting with much caution our results for men.
Of course, contrary to the example in Eq. 23-Eq. 24, there may be many omitted variables that
correlate in different ways with the gender of one’s first child. What if we take as many poten-
tial omitted variables as possible out of the error term? We next check the sensitivity of the IV
results obtained with our preferred instrument to the inclusion of additional individual covariates.
The downside of this check is that we are including on the RHS more possibly endogenous vari-
ables which we cannot instrument. Table 11 reports the results. Comparing this with Table 10,
we see that the effect on employed women’s hours is virtually unaffected. The point estimates
for employed men and women’s participation move upward, but they remain statistically indistin-
guishable from zero.
4 Extensions
In this Section we extend the baseline instrumental variable analysis by briefly exploring several
margins of heterogeneity. This allows us to “test” the plausibility of our results, and to gain a better
understanding of the underlying mechanisms. Henceforth, we restrict to our preferred instrument,
girl f irst. A word of caution is in order, though: exploring heterogeneity means conditioning on (or
splitting the sample along) variables that are potentially endogenous in a richer labor supply model.
Therefore, the following results should be interpreted with care. In particular, we do not claim that
all of these heterogeneous effects are causal. Nonetheless, the results below are informative and
indicate promising avenues for future research.
4.1 Geographic distance
A first, important margin is the geographic proximity between grandparents and grandchildren. A
priori, one cannot tell what the effect on labor supply should be. Although grandparents who live
closer to their grandchildren may transfer more time because the unit transfer cost is lower, those
who live farther away from them need more traveling time per unit transferred.
We exploit information on proximity at the county and Census tract level. Specifically, we
construct proximity dummy variables at these two levels of aggregation that assume value 1 if in-
dividual i lives, in year t, in the same county (samecountyit) or tract (sametractit) of at least one
grandchild, and zero otherwise. Of course these dummies are set to zero for those who have no
grandchildren. According to these indicators, and after applying sampling weights, 65.4% and
41.3% of all grandparents in our final sample live in the same county or Census tract, respectively,
of at least one grandchild. These figures are in line with the findings of Choi (2009), who docu-
ments the pattern of proximity to one’s mother by age in the U.S. using the PSID, and are also con-
sistent with the findings of Compton and Pollak (2013) in the NSFH: these data show that the me-
dian distance between married women in the U.S. and their mothers is 20 miles, with 25% of them
living within 5 miles of their mothers. One’s location is obviously endogenous to labor supply, so
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Table 11: IV (girl f irst) estimates, with additional covariates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
hit hit eit eit Hit Hit
men women men women men women
git -46.7 -377.5 0.125 0.120 193.9 -75.9
(231.3) (172.5) (0.098) (0.106) (292.5) (223.8)
y67i 0.6 -0.2 0.000 0.000 1.1 0.1
(0.3) (0.3) (0.000) (0.000) (0.4) (0.3)
Divorced or separated -78.2 174.1 -0.067 0.069 -198.7 234.8
(23.2) (16.6) (0.011) (0.010) (29.2) (22.1)
Widowed -169.4 31.8 -0.057 0.031 -198.7 72.2
(44.1) (30.2) (0.024) (0.017) (51.9) (32.6)
White 69.9 -71.3 -0.003 0.008 49.6 -18.4
(40.5) (43.0) (0.021) (0.024) (52.1) (53.7)
Black -41.9 7.6 -0.024 -0.001 -79.2 19.0
(42.2) (45.5) (0.022) (0.026) (54.2) (57.4)
Less than high school -66.9 -61.4 -0.050 -0.168 -146.3 -300.4
(28.3) (30.6) (0.013) (0.018) (35.1) (36.5)
College degree 49.6 -62.2 0.064 0.123 169.3 157.2
(36.4) (36.2) (0.015) (0.021) (46.2) (46.3)
Non-labor income (‘000) -0.2 -0.4 -0.000 -0.000 -0.6 -0.8
(0.1) (0.1) (0.000) (0.000) (0.1) (0.1)
Disability -263.9 -212.8 -0.284 -0.256 -737.9 -524.0
(20.5) (17.9) (0.012) (0.010) (27.4) (19.3)
Number own children 4.8 24.4 -0.014 -0.019 -21.7 -14.6
(19.8) (14.5) (0.008) (0.007) (23.8) (15.4)
Number children in household -6.4 -73.0 0.002 -0.023 -3.4 -81.3
(15.5) (9.7) (0.006) (0.005) (18.4) (10.5)
Relocated -69.4 -41.2 -0.022 -0.029 -101.3 -78.9
(15.6) (14.3) (0.006) (0.008) (18.1) (16.4)
Constant 1,289.4 1,414.0 0.308 0.242 433.0 557.8
(193.7) (148.2) (0.073) (0.079) (202.0) (163.5)
Observations 36,272 44,164 43,177 64,833 43,177 64,833
Fixed effects No No No No No No
Age dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Second-stage estimates from 2SLS estimates of Eq. 14, PSID core sample, waves 1968-2011, individuals
(Seniors, in Section 2) no older than 70 who have at least one child (Junior, in Section 2) who is 14 or older. The
dependent variables are, alternately, annual hours of work for pay conditional on being employed (i.e., excluding zero
hours, hit ), an employment dummy (eit ), and unconditional annual hours of work for pay (i.e., including zero hours,
Hit ). The instrument is girl f irst, as defined in Eq. 19. First-stage estimates are reported in Table 8. Covariate y67i is
family income in 1967 and controls for unequal sampling probabilities in a regression framework (Solon et al. (2013)).
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the individual level.
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the previous warning applies.22 We interact these distance indicators with the explanatory variable
of interest, git , and we instrument the interacted variable with the analogous interaction with the
instrument. For instance, git× samecountyit is instrumented with girl f irsti× samecountyit .
The results are reported in Table 12. For employed women, there is a baseline negative effect
of about 185 (about 90, in lower bound) hours, and an additional negative effect of about 205
(about 100, in lower bound) and 260 (about 130, in lower bound) hours for grandmothers living
in the same county or Census tract of at least one grandchild, respectively. Therefore, the average
effect identified in section 3.3.2 is mostly driven by these short-distance grandmothers. This goes
in the direction one expects, i.e., prevalence of the “proximity effect” over a possible “traveling
time effect”. For employed men, instead, the point estimates (which are now a bit more precise)
suggest that distance is irrelevant. Interestingly, the extensive margin effect for women is about
+3 percentage points if living far away, but 2.2 percentage point less than this if living closer.
Unfortunately, standard errors are again too large to draw any reliable conclusion about this margin.
4.2 Number of grandchildren
So far we have looked at the effect of being a grandparent vs. not being one. That is, we have
focused on the “extensive margin” of grandparenting. An obvious question is whether there is
an “intensive margin” effect. That is, conditional on being a grandparent, does the number of
grandchildren play a role, too? The answer is again not obvious, because there are economies of
scale in grandparenting: one can take care of, say, two, three, or four grandchildren employing
roughly the same amount of time it takes to take care of one. On the other hand, the intensive
margin may matter if one has several grandchildren living in different households.
To investigate this question, we interact git with the number of grandchildren individual i has
in year t (ngchildrenit), using girl f irsti×ngchildrenit as an additional instrument. Therefore, the
sum of the coefficients on girl f irsti and girl f irsti×ngchildrenit is the grandparenting “extensive
margin” effect, and the coefficient on the latter is the “intensive margin” effect under the assump-
tion that this is linear in the number of grandchildren. Table 13 reports the results. This table
shows that, if anything, the grandparenting “intensive margin” is small and positive. Virtually all
of the labor supply adjustment of working grandmothers occurs when they first have grandchil-
dren. Taken at face values, these point estimates indicate, for these women, an average reduction
of 475 (about 240, in lower bound) hours when they become grandmothers, which then become
the 380 (190, in lower bound) hours of Table 11 when more grandchildren appear.
4.3 Years since becoming a grandparent and age
The previous result about the predominance of the grandparenting “extensive margin” suggests
the importance of looking at how the labor supply effect we identify unfolds over time after one
first becomes a grandparent. In other words, we ask the following question: how does such effect
varies with the number of years since one first became a grandparent? This is also a convenient
way of checking another margin of heterogeneity, namely having young vs. older grandchildren—
22 However, Compton and Pollak (2014) argue on the basis of exogenous shocks to distance between grandmothers
and grandchildren generated by the relocation of “military households” that the bias from endogenous location is
probably small.
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Table 12: IV estimates. Effect of distance
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
hit hit eit eit Hit Hit
men women men women men women
git –125.2 –184.4 0.033 0.034 –37.6 –78.3
(109.9) (91.2) (0.062) (0.065) (169.9) (134.9)
git× samecountyit –18.1 –206.2 0.073 –0.022 143.6 -148.0
(137.5) (91.3) (0.063) (0.051) (182.6) (104.8)
y67i 1.4 –1.0 0.001 0.001 3.2 0.8
(0.4) (0.4) (0.000) (0.000) (0.6) (0.6)
Constant 1,408.7 937.2 0.181 –0.160 239.5 –457.7
(242.9) (202.9) (0.110) (0.110) (308.0) (224.0)
Observations 37,722 48,331 44,998 71,965 44,998 71,965
Fixed effects No No No No No No
Age dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
(7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
hit hit eit eit Hit Hit
men women men women men women
git –154.2 –183.9 0.033 0.029 –61.6 –87.1
(101.2) (85.2) (0.055) (0.062) (153.9) (128.1)
git× sametractit 16.3 –262.3 0.089 –0.022 205.4 –173.4
(181.3) (117.9) (0.082) (0.063) (236.9) (131.7)
y67i 1.4 –1.1 0.001 0.001 3.2 0.8
(0.4) (0.4) (0.000) (0.000) (0.7) (0.6)
Constant 1,417.5 923.5 0.190 -0.160 268.1 –471.3
(227.8) (198.9) (0.101) (0.103) (280.9) (210.2)
Observations 37,722 48,331 44,998 71,965 44,998 71,965
Fixed effects No No No No No No
Age dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: 2SLS estimates, PSID core sample, waves 1968-2011, individuals (Seniors, in Section 2) no older than 70
who have at least one child (Junior, in Section 2) who is 14 or older. The dependent variables are, alternately, annual
hours of work for pay conditional on being employed (i.e., excluding zero hours, hit ), an employment dummy (eit ),
and unconditional annual hours of work for pay (i.e., including zero hours, Hit ); samecountyit is a dummy that assume
value 1 if individual i lives, in year t, in the same county of at least one grandchild, and zero otherwise, and similarly for
sametractit at the Census tract level. The instruments are girl f irst, as defined in Eq. 19, and girl f irsti× samecountyit
and girl f irsti× sametractit , respectively. Covariate y67i is family income in 1967 and controls for unequal sampling
probabilities in a regression framework (Solon et al. (2013)). Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the
individual level.
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Table 13: IV estimates. Grandparenting “intensive” and “extensive” margins
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
hit hit eit eit Hit Hit
men women men women men women
git –178.3 –525.6 0.199 0.076 267.9 –192.7
(354.6) (256.3) (0.172) (0.148) (494.8) (310.3)
git×ngchildrenit 14.3 50.5 –0.032 –0.022 -55.8 -13.0
(51.1) (31.2) (0.019) (0.013) (53.9) (27.2)
y67i 1.5 –0.9 0.001 0.001 3.1 0.7
(0.3) (0.4) (0.000) (0.000) (0.6) (0.5)
Constant 1,377.8 825.8 0.234 –0.077 325.8 –359.4
(176.0) (149.5) (0.090) (0.088) (248.0) (176.6)
Observations 37,722 48,331 44,998 71,965 44,998 71,965
Fixed effects No No No No No No
Age dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: 2SLS estimates, PSID core sample, waves 1968-2011, individuals (Seniors, in Section 2) no older than 70
who have at least one child (Junior, in Section 2) who is 14 or older. The dependent variables are, alternately, annual
hours of work for pay conditional on being employed (i.e., excluding zero hours, hit ), an employment dummy (eit ), and
unconditional annual hours of work for pay (i.e., including zero hours, Hit ); ngchildrenit is the number of grandchildren
individual i has in year t. The instruments are girl f irst, as defined in Eq. 19, and girl f irsti×ngchildrenit . Covariate
y67i is family income in 1967 and controls for unequal sampling probabilities in a regression framework (Solon et al.
(2013)). Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the individual level.
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presumably, the incidence of young grandchildren is higher during the first years since one first
became a grandparent.
To perform this exercise, we modify the grandparent indicator git to reflect “grandparenting
lags”. That is, we define indicators git` for lags ` = 1, ...,13, where the lag is the number of
years since one first became a grandparent. Indicator git` assumes value zero until (if ever) one
becomes a grandparent, then assumes value 1 if in year t one has grandchildren but no more than
l years elapsed since one became a grandparent, and then assumes value zero again. That is,
contrary to git , git` is not an absorbing indicator. Figure 3 illustrates how git` is constructed. We
summarize in Figure 4 the results for hours of working grandparents.23 This picture shows that for
working women hours drop substantially during the first years since becoming grandmothers, and
then converge to the point estimate reported Table 10, represented in the picture by a horizontal
red line. For working men, if there is an effect, this materialized later on—the point estimate is
effectively zero during the first few years since becoming a grandfather.
Figure 3: Construction of indicator git`
Lag Years since i became a grandparent
(`) · · · –2 –1 0 1 2 3 4 · · ·
1 git1 = 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
2 git2 = 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0
3 git3 = 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0
4 git4 = 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0
... git` = 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1
Notes: The figure illustrates the construction of indicator git`. For given year t and given that individual i becomes
a grandparent in year τ , git` assumes value 0 until year τ , and then assumes value 1 for as many years as the lag `
indicates.
A related but distinct question is how the effect of interest varies with grandparents’ age. To
gauge this margin of heterogeneity we replace git with the interaction between git and age (git ×
ageit), using girl f irsti× ageit as an instrument. As reported in Table 14, the negative effect is
stronger, for working grandparents, the older they are. For employed women, in particular, the
average reduction increases by about 100 hours (50 hours, in lower bound) every 10 years. We
employed alternative specifications where git is interacted with polynomials in age, but these do
not produce evidence of nonlinearities in age, and so are not reported here.
4.4 Quantiles of the hours distribution
Another interesting question is whether there are different effects at different quantiles of the dis-
tribution of hours conditional on employment. This is also a convenient way of checking how, in
practice, employed grandparents adjust labor supply in response to the appearance of grandchil-
dren. We answer this question by employing the instrumental variable quantile regression method
developed by Chernozhukov and Hansen (2006).24
23The analogous estimates for the extensive margin turn out to be too noisy to allow any reliable speculation
24 We implement this regression with the ivqreg Stata code written by Kwak (2010).
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Figure 4: IV estimates by number of years since becoming a grandparent
Notes: The figure illustrates IV point estimates of the effect of git` on hours of working grandparents. The instrument
is girl f irst. Only individuals who have been grandparents for less than ` years are included in the regression. The red,
horizontal lines are the point estimates reported in Table 10 and the associated 95% confidence intervals.
Table 14: IV estimates. Interaction with age
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
hit hit eit eit Hit Hit
men women men women men women
git×ageit –4.0 –10.1 0.002 0.000 0.9 -5.7
(5.0) (4.2) (0.003) (0.003) (7.5) (5.7)
y67i 1.3 –1.2 0.001 0.001 3.1 0.7
(0.5) (0.5) (0.000) (0.000) (0.7) (0.7)
Constant 1543.9 1318.0 0.127 -0.169 235.0 -243.2
(370.4) (336.7) (0.195) (0.203) (532.0) (412.5)
Observations 37,722 48,331 44,998 71,965 44,998 71,965
Fixed effects No No No No No No
Age dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: 2SLS estimates, PSID core sample, waves 1968-2011, individuals (Seniors, in Section 2) no older than 70
who have at least one child (Junior, in Section 2) who is 14 or older. The dependent variables are, alternately, annual
hours of work for pay conditional on being employed (i.e., excluding zero hours, hit ), an employment dummy (eit ), and
unconditional annual hours of work for pay (i.e., including zero hours, Hit ); ngchildrenit is the number of grandchildren
individual i has in year t. The instrument is girl f irsti×ageit . Covariate y67i is family income in 1967 and controls for
unequal sampling probabilities in a regression framework (Solon et al. (2013)). Robust standard errors in parentheses,
clustered at the individual level.
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The coefficients from this regression, at the 25th and 75th quantiles, are reported in Table 15.
This table shows an interesting pattern. While the bulk of the adjustment for employed men,
if any, takes place at the top of the distribution–where overtime work is substantial–employed
women adjust their labor supply mostly at the bottom of distribution–where part-time and more
discontinuous jobs prevail. This pattern suggests that it is working women less attached to the
labor market that reduce labor supply in response to the appearance of grandchildren. Instead, those
women who hold full time, continuous jobs do not seem to adjust their labor supply much. For
working men, on the contrary, if there is any reduction in hours when they become grandparents,
this comes from reducing overtime work.
Table 15: IV estimates at 25th and 75th quantiles
(1) (2) (3) (4)
hit hit hit hit
men women men women
git –6.8 –837.6 –192.2 –75.7
y67i –153.6 115.2 31.1 –42.3
Constant 2110.5 805.3 2518.9 114.0
Observations 37,722 48,331 37,722 48,331
Quantile 25th 25th 75th 75th
Fixed effects No No No No
Age dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Instrumental variable quantile regression (IVQR) at the 25th, 50th, and 75th quantiles of the distribution of
hours conditional on employment. PSID core sample, waves 1968-2011, individuals (Seniors, in Section 2) no older
than 70 who have at least one child (Junior, in Section 2) who is 14 or older. The dependent variable is annual hours
of work for pay conditional on being employed (i.e., excluding zero hours, hit ). The instrument is girl f irst, as defined
in Eq. 19. Covariate y67i is family income in 1967 and controls for unequal sampling probabilities in a regression
framework (Solon et al. (2013)). Standard errors are not estimated.
4.5 Ethnicity and education
Finally, we explore heterogeneity along ethnicity and education. We do so by splitting the sam-
ple according to the two main ethnic categories in our sample (White non-Hispanic and Black
non-Hispanic) and according to three categories of highest educational attainment (less than high
school, high school degree, at least some college). The results are reported in Table 16 and Ta-
ble 17.
If we focus on the coefficients (standard errors are such that there are no statistically significant
difference across the various groups) then we see in these tables that the negative effect on working
grandparents is stronger for whites and for intermediate levels of education. These results may
sound counterintuitive, but it is important to keep in mind the meaning of these coefficients. They
do not mean that white grandparents with intermediate levels of education are doing more child
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Table 16: IV estimates by ethnic group
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
hit hit eit eit Hit Hit
men women men women men women
git –15.5 –686.4 0.107 0.263 206.5 –72.1
(408.7) (408.3) (0.188) (0.275) (564.4) (573.4)
y67i 1.1 –1.2 0.001 0.001 2.4 0.6
(0.6) (0.6) (0.000) (0.000) (0.8) (0.9)
Constant 1230.4 1613.4 0.185 -0.284 169.1 –139.4
(432.0) (472.7) (0.192) (0.294) (571.6) (610.1)
Ethnicity White NH White NH White NH White NH White NH White NH
Observations 26,113 22,113 30,731 30,958 30,731 30,958
Fixed effects No No No No No No
Age dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
(7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
hit hit eit eit Hit Hit
men women men women men women
git –131.0 –312.2 0.133 –0.124 174.7 –432.3
(259.3) (153.2) (0.169) (0.112) (449.5) (235.3)
y67i 1.5 0.9 0.001 0.001 3.2 3.0
(0.9) (0.6) (0.001) (0.000) (1.5) (0.9)
Constant 2,546.4 1,221.6 0.054 0.167 228.3 97.9
(453.5) (312.8) (0.197) (0.139) (529.0) (282.4)
Ethnicity Black NH Black NH Black NH Black NH Black NH Black NH
Observations 9,897 16,213 12,205 24,267 12,205 24,267
Fixed effects No No No No No No
Age dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: 2SLS estimates, PSID core sample, waves 1968-2011, individuals (Seniors, in Section 2) no older than 70
who have at least one child (Junior, in Section 2) who is 14 or older. The dependent variables are, alternately, annual
hours of work for pay conditional on being employed (i.e., excluding zero hours, hit ), an employment dummy (eit ),
and unconditional annual hours of work for pay (i.e., including zero hours, Hit ). Ethnic groups: ‘White NH’ are
individuals reporting white, non-hispanic ethnicity; ‘Black NH’ are individuals reporting black, non-hispanic ethnicity.
The instrument is girl f irst, as defined in Eq. 19. Covariate y67i is family income in 1967 and controls for unequal
sampling probabilities in a regression framework (Solon et al. (2013)). Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered
at the individual level.
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Table 17: IV estimates by education
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
hit hit eit eit Hit Hit
men women men women men women
git 234.5 –211.5 0.103 –0.009 435.4 –103.6
(266.6) (228.2) (0.177) (0.154) (453.3) (291.0)
Education Below HS Below HS Below HS Below HS Below HS Below HS
Observations 8,441 9,751 10,880 19,373 10,880 19,373
(7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
hit hit eit eit Hit Hit
men women men women men women
git –704.6 –529.6 0.236 0.291 –80.1 24.7
(562.1) (276.6) (0.257) (0.215) (724.0) (445.5)
Education HS degree HS degree HS degree HS degree HS degree HS degree
Observations 13,548 21,668 16,231 31,178 16,231 31,178
(13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18)
hit hit eit eit Hit Hit
men women men women men women
git –80.0 –377.5 0.135 0.074 151.6 -93.4
(556.9) (563.0) (0.255) (0.276) (822.5) (658.2)
Education College College College College College College
Observations 15,559 16,568 17,674 20,931 17,674 20,931
Fixed effects No No No No No No
Age dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: 2SLS estimates, PSID core sample, waves 1968-2011, individuals (Seniors, in Section 2) no older than 70
who have at least one child (Junior, in Section 2) who is 14 or older. The dependent variables are, alternately, annual
hours of work for pay conditional on being employed (i.e., excluding zero hours, hit ), an employment dummy (eit ), and
unconditional annual hours of work for pay (i.e., including zero hours, Hit ). Highest educational attainment groups:
‘Below HS’ are individuals who did not attend or did not complete high school; ‘HS degree’ are individuals who
obtained a high school degree (or equivalent degree) but did not attend college; ‘College’ are individuals who attended
college (regardless of whether they graduated or not). The instrument is girl f irst, as defined in Eq. 19. A constant
and covariate y67i (family income in 1967, to controls for unequal sampling probabilities in a regression framework,
Solon et al. (2013)) are included but not reported. Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the individual
level.
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care than the rest of the population. They mean that working individuals in this group are reducing
their labor supply more than other groups in response to becoming a grandparent. Of course, the
baseline levels of employment and hours—as well as the extent to which individuals in different
groups reallocate differently leisure and market work when grandchildren appear—matter in this
respect. We can gain some intuition into this process by looking at average hours, employment,
and time spent taking care of children across such groups.
Table 18 reports these statistics, computed using the PSID and the ATUS, for the population
between 40 and 70 years old. This table shows, for instance, that the group that provides more
child care in this population—black women—is also the group with the lowest employment rate.
When these non-employed women become grandmothers, of course, their time transfer may only
come at the expense of other forms of “leisure”, not labor supply.
Table 18: Labor supply and child care by ethnicity, gender, and education
Work Primary child care Secondary child care Total child care
Group Hours Employed Min Frac. >0 Min Frac. >0 Min Frac. >0
Black men 2062.4 0.745 17.1 0.155 66.7 0.179 83.8 0.237
Black women 1721.2 0.641 26.5 0.234 90.0 0.243 116.5 0.320
White men 2180.7 0.829 18.7 0.178 61.9 0.188 80.6 0.249
White women 1659.3 0.678 33.1 0.249 76.3 0.215 109.4 0.297
Less than high school 1823.4 0.589 23.1 0.182 80.9 0.210 104 0.279
High school degree 1852.9 0.708 21.4 0.188 67.9 0.199 89.3 0.262
At least come college 1960.3 0.817 29.7 0.246 79.5 0.231 109.2 0.308
Employed 1900.6 1 23.6 0.225 75.0 0.229 98.6 0.303
Not employed 0 0 31.9 0.209 77.8 0.194 109.7 0.261
Notes: The table reports, for various demographic and socioeconomic groups and for individuals between 40 and 70
years old, labor supply measures from the PSID (1967-2010) and child care measures from the ATUS (2008-2012).
Sampling weights are applied. The labor supply measures are hours conditional on employment and the fraction
employed. The child care measures are average daily minutes (including zeros) of primary and secondary child care
(caring for and helping, and activities related to children’s education and health, and associated travel time), and the
fraction reporting a strictly positive amount of minutes. The last column is the sum of average of the products of
minutes and such fraction across primary and secondary child care time. Both children living in the household and
those living in another household are considered. ‘White’ and ‘Black’ do not include Hispanic origin. The education
labels refer to highest educational attainment. ‘Less than HS’ are individuals who did not attend or did not complete
high school; ‘HS degree’ are individuals who obtained a high school degree (or equivalent degree) but did not attend
college; ‘College’ are individuals who attended college, regardless of whether they graduated or not.
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5 Conclusions
While there is a large literature on the labor supply effect of becoming a parent, time use data show
that many older workers make large time transfers in the form of grandparent-provided child care.
In this paper we have investigated the consequences of such transfers for senior workers’ labor
supply. Estimation is hampered by the fact that even though the decision to have a child is made
by the parents, the knowledge of grandparents’ willingness to contribute hours, money, or both
toward child care may have influences on the decision of the parent. Therefore, we have employed
instruments to overcome the ensuing endogeneity of the grandparent status.
The estimation provides evidence on the causal effect of becoming a grandparent on labor
supply late in the working life. The baseline evidence indicates that working grandmothers in the
U.S. reduce their labor supply by at least 190 hours every year relative to their counterparts who
are not grandmothers. For men the number is lower, about 70 hours per year, but with a large
standard error and a possible upward bias which suggests much caution.
We have also found that the reduction in hours for grandmothers occurs towards the bottom
of the hours distribution, is larger in the first year or two of becoming a grandmother, and falls
as the grandchild ages. For men, the effect originates towards the top of the distribution, is not
as pronounced, and occurs somewhat later than that for grandmothers. Moreover, distance from
the grandchild matters. For women, the reduction in hours of work increases with proximity to
grandchildren, roughly an additional 100 hours if living in the same county and 130 if living in the
same census tract. However, it appears that for men, the entire effect is driven by those living far
away from the grandchildren, but again with large standard errors.
How large is the baseline effect we have identified? We have reported in Section 1 that condi-
tional on strictly positive transfers, women and men spend on average 820 and 440 hours, after age
50, taking care of their grandchildren. Our baseline lower bounds account for about 23% and 16%
of these time transfers, respectively. This is the answer to the question we ask in the Introduction,
namely how much grandparenting comes at the expense of other forms of “leisure” and how much
comes at the expense of market labor supply?
Furthermore, we can use our estimates to perform a back-of-the-envelope calculation of the
role of grandparenting in contributing to the large reductions in senior workers’ labor supply along
the intensive margin we have documented in Rupert and Zanella (2012). In that paper we show that
in the PSID working women reduce labor supply by about 400 hours between the age of 50 and
64. The corresponding reduction for men is much larger, about 720 hours. Because about 85% of
individuals in our sample become parents and because, of these, about 90% become grandparents
at some point in life, then this channel accounts for 0.85×0.9×190/400 ' 36% for women and
0.85×0.9×70/720 ' 8% for men. These magnitudes are non-negligible, especially for women,
and point at the importance of the question we have investigated in this paper. Increasing life
expectancy in advanced countries offers parents an inexpensive, flexible, and reliable source of
child care—grandparents. However, a prolonged and healthy mature age also requires a longer
attachment to the labor market during the late stages of the life cycle. There is a possible trade-off
between these two desiderata.
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